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Abstract
Two key factors that have so far allowed fast growing economies of central and eastern
Europe to cope with their external constraint have been i) the presence of relatively low
unit labour costs and ii) the initial undervaluation of the exchange rate.  The accession to
the EU will inevitably reduce both sources of competitiveness of eastern European
exports: real wages are likely to catch-up western European levels and current EU
members are pushing these countries to enforce labour market and social regulations that
will increase labour costs; moreover, stability of the exchange rate will be a pre-
condition for the negotiations over the accession to proceed.
Small open economies can grow faster than their neighbours without running into a
balance of payment crises if they succeed in increasing the number of differentiated goods
produced domestically.  The multiplication of the number of varieties in these countries
after trade liberalisation is an unambiguous sign that consumers coming from the empty
shelves of the pre-transition era have a strong taste for varieties, and hence that new
varieties can create their own demand.   But the increase in the number of varieties will
involve a furthering of the worker reallocation process as production is still largely
concentrated in homogeneous good and scale-intensive industries and enterprise density
is significantly lower than in western Europe.
This paper will start by reviewing the changing profile and orientation of trade in
transitional economies of central and eastern Europe.  Next, developments in enterprise
density and the performance of greenfield vs. state and privatised firms will be reviewed
in an attempt to assess barriers to the entry and growth of small business.  Finally,
numerical simulations of a model will be developed which enables to assess the likely
impact on employment, unemployment and gross worker flows of reductions in start-up
costs.
Keywords: transition countries, product variety, trade specialisation
JEL classification: F12, L11, P21
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1. Introduction
Two key factors that have so far allowed fast growing economies of central and eastern Europe to
cope with their external constraint have been i) the presence of relatively low unit labour costs and
ii) the initial under-valuation of the exchange rate.  The accession to the EU will inevitably reduce
both sources of competitiveness of eastern European exports. Real wages are likely to catch-up
western European levels and current EU members are pushing these countries to enforce labour
market and social regulations that will increase labour costs. Moreover, stability of the exchange
rate will be a pre-condition for the negotiations over the accession to proceed.
Small open economies can grow faster than their neighbours without running into a balance of
payment crises if they succeed in increasing the number of differentiated goods produced
domestically.  The multiplication of the number of varieties in these countries after trade
liberalisation is an unambiguous sign that consumers coming from the empty shelves of the pre-
transition era have a strong taste for varieties, and hence that new varieties can create their own
demand. But the increase in the number of varieties will involve a furthering of the worker
reallocation process as production is still largely concentrated in homogeneous good and scale-
intensive industries and enterprise density is significantly lower than in Western Europe.
This major re-orientation of consumption away from the previous homogenised goods towards the
type of differentiated goods existing in western markets has often been neglected by the literature
on transition economics (Boeri, 1997). Indeed, there was a formidable lack of varieties in the pre-
transition period, which prevented the socialist-autarkic equilibrium to be jointly determined from
the demand and supply side: consumers were strongly rationed in the purchase of varieties
(Matsuyama, 1995).  Accordingly, we argue in this paper that the “variety effect” can contribute to
explain some of the puzzles associated with the pattern of trade flows during the transition process.
Notably, it could explain why trade did not collapse in line with output and the major geographical
re-orientation of trade with an increased demand for products produced in the West.  It also enables
to understand why persistent trade specialisation of these countries in energy and capital-intensive
industries.  It can also help to draw some lessons for the management of the transition process,
notably the exchange rate regime.
This paper will start by reviewing the changing profile and orientation of trade in transitional
economies of central and eastern Europe.  Next, developments in enterprise density and the
performance of greenfield vs. state and privatised firms will be reviewed in an attempt to assess
barriers to the entry and growth of small business.  Finally, numerical simulations a model will be
developed which enables to assess the likely impact on employment, unemployment and gross
worker flows of reductions in start-up costs.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
2. The patterns of trade flows during the transition
This section documents the stylised facts about the pattern of trade flows during the transition.  For
the sake of statistical comparability, the focus will be on the group of Visegrad countries, Romania
and Slovenia.
2.1 Trade did not collapse in line with output
All transition countries experienced after 1989 one of the most marked depressions ever observed in
recent economic history.  Between 1989 and 1991, GDP declined in Eastern Europe by as much as
30 per cent in countries such as Bulgaria and Romania (Figure 1). Different causes for the output
declines have been discussed in the literature
2.
While this transitional depression is a well known and documented fact in the literature, the fact that
trade volumes did not collapse in line with output has received much less attention. While these
countries were experiencing a deep economic depression imports were rather buoyant (Figure 2)
throghout the region, with the only exception of Bulgaria.
The asymmetries in output and trade dynamics point to supply-side determinants of GDP falls in
transitional economies.
2.2 The collapse of CMEA and unexpectedly rapid trade re-orientation
By 1989, approximately one quarter of trade of central and Eastern Europe was with the former
USSR.  Intra-regional trade in Eastern Europe accounted for roughly 15-16 per cent of the trade
turnover (Figure 3).  OECD countries covered already more than 40 per cent of trade flows and the
rest of the world another 16 per cent.  Six years later, in 1995, the picture had substantially changed.
Exports to the Russian Federation were only of the order of 10 per cent, imports from Russia did
not reach 15 per cent of total imports and the share of intra-regional trade was well below 10 per
cent.  The share of trade turnover with the rest-of-the-world also decreased somewhat with respect
to the pre-transition era, whilst the developed market economies (mainly the European Union)
accounted by 1995 for almost 70 per cent of both exports and imports of central and eastern Europe.
2.3 The persistent specialisation in traditional goods
A third feature of trade patterns has been the persistent trade specialisation of transitional
economies in heavy energy-intensive industries and low-skilled segments of the manufacturing
sector, in spite of a rather well-educated labour force with lower cost of labour relative to their
western counterparts.  In order to document this fact, we computed the following revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) indicator proposed by Neven (1995):
                                                          
2 For example, a disorganisation effect of the previous production and distribution networks (Blanchard and Kremer,
1997; Roland and Verdier, 1999) or the loss of CMEA markets. Nevertheless, the country-by-country patterns suggest
that the output fall can be partly explained by taking into account the level of pre-transition distortions and the
management of the reform process. For example, in the most advanced transition countries, such as Hungary or
Slovenia, a more decentralised decision-making process was already in place before the transition. Some countries also
adopted reforms more quickly and fully, thus reinforcing their favourable position. Overall, the larger output declines
and late bottoming-out can be found in countries which had the largest pre-transition distortions and have accumulated
delays in implementing reforms, such as Romania and Bulgaria.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
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where Xi and Mi are, respectively, the exports and imports of product i.  This indicator is bounded
between 100 and (-100).  The lower and upper limit of the index can be attained only in the
(theoretical) case when there is a complete trade specialisation and there are only two goods.  Under
real world circumstances, the value of the index rarely exceed 10 (in modules).  The higher the
value of the index, the stronger trade specialisation
3.
We selected according to this criterion the top-7 and the bottom-7 RCAs for manufacturing
products
4, for all countries for which data were available (Table 1).  The top-seven products account
for 27 to 40 per cent of exports, whilst the bottom-seven for 25 to 30 per cent of imports.  Thus, the
table covers a significant portion of the trade turnover.  We are only focusing on manufacturing
products for two reasons.  First, agricultural products tend to be highly distorted by strong trade
barriers in European markets which affect our measure of comparative advantage.  Second, the
product variety effects discussed in this paper are mainly related to manufactured products.
By mid-1995, most transition countries were still characterised by a persistent specialisation on
homogeneous goods produced by heavy industries. In the Czech Republic the main revealed
comparative advantages are in heavy industries and intermediate products such as iron and steel
(ISIC 67), non-metallic mineral manufactures (ISIC 66, e.g. glass), metal products (ISIC 69), textile
yarns (ISIC 65) or base chemicals (e.g. ISIC 51).  The only final consumption product represented
among the top-7 RCAs is road vehicles (ISIC 78).  All these industries were the core of the former
industrial structure.  In Slovakia, the bias towards heavy industries was even more marked with the
iron and steel sector having an RCA above 10 and accounting, by itself, for 17 per cent of total
exports.  In contrast, the comparative disadvantages are observed in consumer goods or highly
differentiated industries, that is, sectors characterised by a large number of varieties, such as office
machines (ISIC 75), telecommunications (ISIC 76), machinery (ISIC  72,74 and 77) or
pharmaceutical products (ISIC 54). Poland appeared relatively more specialised in final
consumption goods, produced in light industries, such as articles of apparel and clothing (ISIC 84),
furniture (ISIC 82) or transport equipment (ISIC 79).  However, it should be noted that these
exports are the result of an intense subcontracting with western firms
5.  Product specification and
design (i.e. the activities most relevant for product differentiation) are mainly realised by the
contractors rather than by the local firms.  The other main RCAs follow a pattern similar to that of
the Czech Republic.
Only Hungary and Slovenia display the main comparative advantages on light industries and are
also able to be significant net exporters in industries such as Electrical machinery (ISIC 77), plastics
(ISIC 57) or pharmaceutical products (ISIC 54).  This is a clear sign of a more advanced stage of
the transition.
Summarising: trade did not collapse in line with output, its geographical orientation changed
dramatically, while the sectoral specialisation of transitional economies did not.  The model
                                                          
3 The RCA index can be interpreted as a "normalised" trade balance (i.e. given that the sum of the RCA indicator across
sectors is equal to zero, the comparative advantages are in this way measured under the theoretical condition of a
balanced trade).  The value of this indicator is also related to the intensity of intra-industry trade.  The stronger two-way
trade, the lower specialisation, the closer to zero the index (see OECD, 1996 and 1997).
4 As can be seen from Table 1, the value of the RCA index decreases (in modules) rather quickly, hence there is no loss
of information in confining the list to the top-seven and bottom-seven products.  More detailed results are, in any event,
available from the authors upon request.
5 See Hoekman and Djankov (1996) for evidence on the role of outward processing trade in the trade relations between
the EU and Eastern Europe.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
developed in the next section accounts for these facts and enables to make predictions as to the
future course of events.
3.  Product variety and the transition: a simple model
Surprisingly enough, the literature on transitional economies has overlooked a crucial dimension of
structural change, namely the shift from “homogenised” goods to differentiated goods and, in
particular, to many different product varieties.  Why were varieties lacking before the start of
transition?  Under central planning, resources were systematically diverted away from final
consumption goods, and countries maintained very limited trade relations with western countries,
which were confined to exports of raw material or intermediate goods.  Moreover, the increase in
the number of varieties available to consumers generally requires a multiplication in the number of
firms and there were practically insurmountable entry barriers to enterprise creation in these
countries
6.  A characteristic of the socialist firms was also a high degree of vertical integration
which naturally (even under a market system) does not favour the development of product
varieties
7.
One of the first steps of the transition towards a market economy was the opening-up to trade, and
hence the lifting of restrictions to the purchase of differentiated goods by domestic consumers.  Put
another way, demand started to matter in the determination of the equilibrium.  Accordingly, a large
number of varieties were imported.  Domestic production of varieties also has begun, but gradually.
The build-up of a network of variety producers is, after all, a time consuming and costly process.
Insofar as this process requires new business start-ups, there are large sunk entry costs to be
afforded and high failure rates.  Entry barriers were particularly high in Eastern Europe because of a
lack of market institutions, entrepreneurship, and financial intermediaries channelling resources to
new enterprise creation.  The stronger entry barriers, the less business start-ups, the slower the
development of new varieties.
3.1  Consumption technologies
The effects of the development of varieties on trade and domestic production can be highlighted
within a very simple model.  The demand plays a major role in our results.  Thus, it is useful to start
by characterising consumption technologies.
We are mainly interested here in isolating the effects of the increase in the number of products.
Hence, we will not assume changes over time in consumers’ tastes (e.g., intervening at the start of
transition) or asymmetries in tastes between the transitional economy (the East) and the rest of the
world (the West).  We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that there are only two goods -- an
homogenised product (H) and a differentiated good (D).  The homogenised good assembles the
characteristics of varieties into a lower quality homogenous good.  Preferences of the representative
consumer
8 are of the standard, CES-type:
[]
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6 Hungary is a partial exception in this context.  Entry was allowed, but only for relatively large firms.
7 See Feenstra et al. (1997) for an evidence of this effect in the case of the exports of Korea and Taiwan.
8 We allow only for horizontal product differentiation.  Thus, there is no problem in modelling the economy as
populated by a single consumer.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
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This specification of the utility function has the advantage of summarising all the relevant
information on consumers’ preferences in three basic parameters. The parameter ρ  characterises the
degree of substitutability between homogeneous and differentiated goods, whilst α  is a
“distributional” parameter, affecting the allocation of the consumer’s budget between the two
bundles of goods.  We assume that consumers prefer varieties to the homogenised good, and hence
we restrict the parameter α  to be lower than .5.  Finally, the parameter θ  summarises the extent of
“love for varieties” of consumers: the lower θ , the stronger the welfare change associated to the
multiplication of varieties available to consumers.  As is apparent from (2), the sub-utility function
over the differentiated good is also modelled as a CES function, following the standard Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) model.  Out of a very large potential number of varieties (M), only n goods are
produced and are available to consumers.
The utility maximisation problem can, as usual, be split in two stages.  At first, the representative
consumer decides how to allocate her/his budget between the homogeneous and the composite
differentiated good.  At the second stage, the consumer decides how to allocate her expenditure
over the available varieties.
As customary in the product variety literature, we assume that production technologies allow for
increasing returns in both variety and homogenised good productions.  This requires that firms have
some degree of monopoly power in order to be profitable.  We assume further that the extent of
increasing returns is larger in homogenised good production than in the production of varieties,
insofar as the latter involves higher fixed costs
9.
We will also keep the standard assumption that each variety can be produced by only one
(atomistic) firm
10.  Since everything is symmetric in this model, at the equilibrium all varieties will
be equally priced.  Define this identical price of each variety as p.  Given the utility function, the
consumer will spread her consumption uniformly over varieties, demanding the same amount (say
x) of each brand.  We can therefore rewrite the (relative) demand for the homogenous good as
follows:
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where  ) 1 ( 1 ρ − = σ  is the elasticity of substitution between the homogenised (H) and the composite
good (D).  This shows that increases in the number of varieties (n) produced involve reductions in
the consumption of the homogenous good.  Put another way, when a large number of varieties
                                                          
9 Define by a
i and a
i
l respectively, overhead and unit input requirements in the production of variety i.  For symmetry
we impose that a
i = a and a
i
l = al for all i.  The homogenised good has a stronger degree of economy of scale than
varieties because a
H > a and a
H
l =< al.
10  A convincing rationale for this assumption is that imitation involves sunk costs and that firms may engage in ex-post
price competition.  Under these conditions, imitators would never be able to recoup the sunk-costs at entry.  We also
rule out the (remote) possibility of having more varieties of the same type being produced prior to the opening to trade.
This is because, prior to transition, there are virtually no varieties produced domestically (see below).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
becomes available to consumers, PH   must decline in order to sell any given supply of the
homogenised good.
The fact that the demand of the composite good increases with n does not mean that the demand for
each variety increases as well.  Insofar as the elasticity of substitution across varieties (σ x) is higher
than σ , (i.e., inasmuch as θ  > ρ ) the demand for each variety will actually decline with n.  We will
assume henceforth that this is the case.  This is quite natural an assumption as typically the degree
of substitutability is larger within than between composite goods.
3.2 Comparing equilibria before and after trade liberalisation
We use the above static framework simply to characterise the impact effect of trade liberalisation.
Prior to transition only the homogenised good is produced domestically (e.g., there is only one type
of shirts, soft drinks or cars) and consumers have no access to imported varieties.  Such an outcome
(the fact that only the homogenised good is produced) can be pursued by a (non-benevolent) central
planner maximising output along with the Marxian primary accumulation ideology
11.  Thus initially
consumers can only have access to H.
At the outset of transition, trade is liberalised.  This involves a sudden increase in the number of
varieties available to eastern residents.  Now they can finally spread their consumption over the
large number of varieties (n
w) produced in the West.  As domestic and foreign consumers have
identical preferences, the country is small relative to the West and there are no asymmetries in
production technologies
12, varieties can only have the same price
13 at the equilibrium, namely the
price initially prevailing in western markets
14 (p
w).  Denote by x the demand for varieties of a
representative consumer; x is decreasing in p
w and  -- as discussed above -- in the total number of
variety producers (n
w). Trade equilibrium at the start of transition will therefore be given by:
()
e
x
w w w H n p x p = ⋅ ⋅   ,  (4)
where  Hx
e denotes net eastern exports of the homogenised good.  In other words, the eastern country
must be initially a net exporter of the homogenised good in order to finance imports of varieties.
Insofar as varieties start being produced domestically, then also varieties can be exported as trade
becomes increasingly of the (horizontal) intra-industry type.  But entry of variety is a long process,
                                                          
11 The problem of the planner can be written as follows:
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where L is the total amount iof labour resources in the economy (work is considered as a duty, so that the planner can
freely dispose of L).  This is a two-stage linear programming problem whose solution is at the extreme point  n=0.
12  The case where domestic producers of varieties are less efficient than their western counterparts is not treated herein
for the sake of simplicity.  Under asymmetric technologies, we would expect to have deficits in the trade balance even
at the long-run equilibrium.
13 As in standard monopolistic competition models, this common price of varieties, p, will embody a mark-up over
operating costs, which is inversely related to the elasticity of demand for varieties, hence to the total number of variety
producers.
14  If n
w is sufficiently large, the opening to trade with the East (the appearance of a new variety) does not alter the
equilibrium price of varieties.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
as discussed below.  Meanwhile, coping with the external constraint forces transitional countries to
sell low-price homogeneous goods abroad.
The second event marking the start of transition is the free entry of variety producers. According to
the standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model, the optimal number of varieties
produced in the East in the long-run will depend on the size of the market, the degree of
substitutability across varieties and the sunk costs (F) associated with the creation of new firms. Let
L
e and L
w denote the eastern and western populations, respectively.  We have then that:
n
L
F
e
e
x
=
⋅ σ
(5)
As is apparent from (5) and the symmetry in technologies and preferences, trade in varieties is
balanced only when enterprise density in the East converges to the levels prevailing in the West,
that is:
n
L
n
L
e
e
w
w = (6)
Insofar as enterprise density in the East is lower than in the West, the country is bound to export the
homogenised product.
Summarising, this simple static model predicts that transitional economies initially experience a
large trade deficit in differentiated goods, financed via large exports of the homogenised good, and,
in the long-run, only trade of the intra-industry type
15.
In order to fully characterise trade equilibrium after the transition, we still have to mention what
happens to the terms of trade.  As variations in p
w  associated to the entry of firms in the East are of
a second-order magnitude (L
w is large relative to L
e) changes in the terms of trade can only be
associated to variations in the production of the homogenised good
16.  The impact effect of trade
liberalisation is, as we have shown, a marked decline in PH. The terms of trade improve only
gradually for the transitional economy insofar as an increasing number of varieties is produced
domestically.  This involves less production, hence higher prices, of the homogenised good.
3.3.  The Transition
Increasing the number of firms is a time-consuming process and, especially in manufacturing, may
involve significant sunk costs.  Moreover, the probability of failure is high.  In EU countries failure
                                                          
15 A possible extension of our model is to assume that the (total) factor productivity in the production of varieties
increases with the number of intermediate inputs available to enterprises.  We do not pursue this route herein although –
when interpreted in terms of intermediate goods  -- the shift towards increasing varieties movement can also be
interpreted as a shift from energy-intensive and homogeneous products to light and diversified productions.
16 As it can be derived from the CES dual price price index for the composite good, the change in the price of the
composite good from the initial and the long-run equilibria is given by
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rates among entrants are as high as 50 per cent after five years of business
17 (EuroStat, 1996a).
Failure rates in transitional economies may be even larger given a lack of entrepreneurship, bad
infrastructures to support new business creation, a banking system unable to provide venture capital
for new business because highly inefficient and often interlocked with large (and heavily indebted)
corporations, and potentially large co-ordination failures.  Thus, it seems to be more realistic to
model the development of varieties as a lengthy process, involving high sunk costs and many
episodes of failure.
The above features of the entry process can be framed in a very parsimonious fashion in a Harris-
Todaro type dynamic model, involving labour reallocation from the homogenised good producer to
firms producing varieties.  A model of this kind is sketched in Annex 1 and provides the support for
the numerical simulations discussed below.  Workers can move from one sector to the other
experiencing intervening non-employment spells
18.  Thus, the decision to leave the homogenised
good firm involves some risks.  Workers can only be induced to take such risks if there is an
insurance providing them income support while not having a job and probabilities of success are not
too low.  An alternative, but equivalent in terms of the operation of our model, way to read this
reallocation process is to consider that homogenised good producers behave as monopolists,
reacting to changes in the demand for the homogenised product with cuts in production capacity.
However, measures to “buy-out” the workers are required to shed labour, given the power of the
workers’ councils to appoint and dismiss managers.  Models of this kind, embodying political
economy barriers to staff reductions, are frequent in the optimal speed of transition literature (Boeri,
1999).
The production of a new variety is modelled as a self-employment choice.  This is consistent with
the observation in these countries of very large increases in self-employment rates at the outset of
transition.  The startup of such new activities, involves significant sunk costs, F, which can be
financed by investing the unemployment benefits.  Many transitional countries have in place startup
loans involving the provision of residual unemployment benefit claims as a lump-sums to the
workers wishing to try their luck. The workers who succeed in the startup, enjoy the rents
associated with the production of varieties (the rents are due to the presence of sunk costs) until
they fail.  There is indeed an exogenous probability of failure after entry, λ , for all variety
producers.  Those workers who do not succeed in starting up a new activity, lose their previous
period unemployment benefits, but may try once more their luck next period, clearly paying again
the sunk costs.
Unemployment benefits are financed via taxes on labour, notably on rents in the production of
varieties.  Hence they play a twofold role in this model.  On the one hand, they induce workers to
change jobs (or, equivalently, allow homogenised good producers to restructure their firms).  On the
other hand, they make for non-employment created in the transition to exert a negative “fiscal
externality” on the development of varieties.
There were many gaps in the provision of varieties to be filled at the outset.  Many gaps meant
easier entry at the outset, although not necessarily easier survival after entry.  Thus we model the
probability of success as decreasing
19 in the number of varieties produced (in the size of the self-
employment pool).  In particular, the probability of success is increasing in the deviation of the
initial density of firms from its long-run equilibrium (6). Denoting by V  the (ex-ante) value of
                                                          
17 Cf. the special issue (n.13, 1995) on entry and post-entry behaviour of firms of the International Journal of Industrial
Organisation.
18 See Boeri (2000) for a model allowing for on-the-job search a direct shifts from one firm to the other.
19 The probability decreases less than proportionally with n as there may be critical mass effects related to the creation
of a mittlestand of variety producers.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
producing a variety, and by e the number of firms paying the sunk entry costs, we have the free-
entry condition:
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where π  denotes the probability of success, and δ the discount factor(δ =+ 11 r )
20.  Insofar as the
stream of profits attainable by entrants declines with n, all apprentice businessmen will leave the
homogenised good firm immediately after trade liberalisation.  There is evidence of a veritable
explosion in the number of registered entrepreneurs and private entities just after the first systemic
reforms (see OECD, 1992, table 6.4).
As is apparent from (8), the number of newly registered private entrepreneurs will be larger, the
greater n* and the lower F.
Figure 4 displays numerical simulations of the model.  In the baseline scenario (continuous lines),
unemployment benefits are set to replace 35 per cent of wages in the homogenised good production.
This is broadly in line with the levels currently prevailing in the Visegrad countries.  Sunk entry
costs match exactly this amount so that those trying to startup their own business can just use the
benefit for this purpose.  As shown by the top panel, (self)employment in varieties increases rapidly
soon after the start of transition; the growth continues afterwards at a slower pace and reaches in
five years about 50 per cent of the working age population.  From being inexistent at the outset,
non-employment also jumps immediately, as workers leave (or laid-off from) the homogenised
good producers; then non-employment declines in line with the growth in the number of varieties,
which are the engine to job creation.  It increases again at later years insofar as the startup of new
activities is made more difficult by the filling of most market niches while employment continues to
steadily decline in the homogenised good sector. Output follows the U-shaped pattern characterised
in the first section of this paper.  Output falls originate from two factors: the first is the impact of
trade liberalisation on the price of the homogenised good; the second is the decline of employment
in H which, in presence of increasing returns to scale, involves more than proportional declines in
output.
Two simple experiments are carried out with this model.  The first involves a decline in the sunk
costs at entry.  This causes non-employment to rise (and output to decline) more at the outset than
in the baseline.  This is because more workers are induced to leave the homogenised good
production for self-employment.  However, lower entry costs induce faster growth of self-
employment (and less non-employment) later on.  The second experiment consists of declines in
non-employment benefits.  In this case we have just the opposite result.  Non-employment falls less
at the outset than in the baseline, but later is also slower to recover.  This is because lower
unemployment benefits discourage self-employment choices, hence the structural change required
to foster the growth of varieties.
                                                          
20 The literature on product variety often makes a number of assumptions which essentially reduce consumption choices
to a static decision problem [Grossman and Helpman, 1992].  Following this convention – which may actually be more
justified when modelling transitional economies rather than OECD countries – we therefore assume that the pure rate of
time preference of consumers equals the market interest rates.  This implies that (nominal) spending is constant over
time.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
Figure 4.  Numerical Simulations of the Model.
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4  Coping with the puzzles
The model(s) sketched in the previous section accounts for the three stylised facts of transition
inspiring this paper.
4.1 Supply-side determinants of the output collapse
The model above generates steep output declines at the outset of transition as a result of trade
liberalisation and structural change.  The opening to trade reduces the (relative) price of the
homogenised good.  Structural reallocation causes labour to move away from the H sector and
output falls even more than employment, due to the presence of increasing returns to scale
21.
Both effects are larger when the country starts with a very low enterprise density.  This is because
the price change associated to trade liberalisation is larger in this case and the scope of labour
reallocation is larger, given that there are more gaps in the provision of varieties to be filled.
Hence, not only this model accounts for the coexistence of output falls and increasing trade with the
West, but also predicts that output falls should be larger in the countries having at the outset the
lowest enterprise densities.  It also suggests that countries with low unemployment benefits (or high
entry costs) should experience lower output (and, above all, employment) losses at the outset, but
also slow, if any, recovery afterwards.  This seems to fit well with the asymmetries in the patterns
of employment and output adjustment in the Visegrad countries vis-à-vis Bulgaria, Romania and the
CIS countries.
While our focus is here mainly on the output collapse, this model can also mimic the GDP decline
registered in transitional economies at the beginning of the 1990s.  The latter stems from the
increase in the price of varieties associated with trade liberalisation and failure of national accounts
(CPI indexes) to properly measure the variety effect.  The latter is typically obtained as a simple
weighted (by the consumption shares) average of the prices of the various goods, that is, in our
model the (national accounts) consumer price index before trade liberalisation is given by:
CPI p $ () =⋅ +− ⋅ αα 1( 8 )
and hence, the recorded change in CPI is:
∆ CPI p p
w $ () ( ) =−− 1 α (9)
whereas the change in the “true” CPI index, that is, the index which properly takes into account the
increase in the number of varieties is:
                                                          
21 Rather than ruling out other explanations for the U-shaped output dynamics in these countries, the story behind our
model is consistent – if not complementary -- with the work of two additional factors, which may have magnified
output losses.  First, as suggested by Daianu (1996), the large change in relative prices induced by the transition (e.g.,
the change in relative prices between homogeneous and differentiated goods induced by the explosion of n )  cannot be
easily absorbed in a short period.  Neither changes in relative prices can be accommodated via exchange rate
adjustments.  Therefore, the transitional economy is put under a “strain” taking its short-run equilibrium further away
from the production frontier.   Second, the traditional sectors producing homogenised goods were typically composed of
large and extremely integrated firms.  This created different sorts of indivisibilities that magnified output losses
associated with the shift of resources from the production of homogeneous goods towards the differentiated good sector.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
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Equation (10) shows that consumer prices may actually decline after trade liberalisation insofar as
the effect on the increasing number of varieties available to consumers offsets the increase in the
price of each single variety.   Table 5 provides a numerical illustration of how the variety effect can
produce rather different pictures of the impact on GDP of trade liberalisation.  Assuming the
counterfactual parameters of our simulation, if one uses (9) real GDP collapses whilst applying (10)
a slight increase of the true GDP measure is actually observed.
4.2.  The “perverse” trade specialisation
As shown above, the balance of trade for varieties is initially in deficit and improves with the
increase in the number of varieties produced domestically.  Therefore a transitional country is
initially a net exporter of H even if at the long-run equilibrium the country increases its
specialisation in the differentiated good.  The issue is that H has to be exported until a critical mass
of domestic variety producers is reached.
4.3. The collapse of CMEA and  trade reorientation
As discussed in Section 2, trade within the CMEA mainly involved final “homogenised” goods
(apart from the imports of energy and raw-materials from the former USSR).  After trade
liberalisation none of the former CMEA partners had the supply potential to satisfy the demand for
differentiated products and excess supply of H.
4.  Back to the Evidence
According to our model, the transitional depression is related to shifts in the structure of
consumption rewarding differentiated products and inertia of the previous supply structure to adapt
to this shock.  This explanation of a supply-driven depression is consistent with two facts
documented above, namely: i) aggregate investment fell less than output
22, and ii) while GDP and
industrial production were collapsing, imports did not fall in the same fashion and actually grew
very rapidly after the early transition phase.  An important feature of our model is that the demand
shift occurs without (exogeneous) changes in the preferences.
Our story is also consistent with the increase in enterprise density registered since 1990 in all
transitional economies.  Table 4 – drawn from a report recently issued by EuroStat (1996b)  --
shows that enterprise density has indeed rapidly increased in central and Eastern Europe, although it
is still below the levels prevailing in EU countries.
                                                          
22 In a demand-driven depression the investment would be expected to fall in line with output.  This was not observed in
the transition countries where a revival of investment occurred before the output bottomed-out  (see on this Rostowski,
1997).  It should also be stressed that investment in business startups is poorly recorded by national accounts.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
Figure 6 shows that the relation between the enterprise density
23 (corrected for the dormant or dead
firms) and the levels of real income per capita (GDP at PPP rates) holds reasonably well on a cross-
country including both the transition and the western European countries.  The countries more
advanced in the transition as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia are also the countries with
the highest GDP per capita and enterprise density.  Moreover, the countries where enterprise density
was higher from the start (hence, according to our model, the countries that were initially producing
more varieties) displayed lower and less protracted declines in output. For example, output fell
more in Poland than in Hungary.  This is also consistent with the predictions of our model.
The soaring trade deficits that appeared in the early stages of transition and re-appeared again in
1996 and 1997 are also in line with the implications of our model.  Insofar as the number of
domestic variety producers is far from its long-run equilibrium, increases in real wages (e.g.,
associated to catch-up effects) translate into increased demand for varieties that, for a large part, are
imported.  In our model labour supply fixed, but these unit labour cost effects can be modelled as
exogeneous changes in marginal costs of H making it more difficult for the country to finance its
variety gap.  Overall, the only way to sustain real wage growth over the long-run is in the growth of
varieties, a growth which creates its own demand.
6.  Final remarks
The purpose of this paper was to show that a better understanding of the transition mechanics can
be gained by considering a dimension of structural change which has been, thus far, fairly neglected
by the literature.  We refer to the “shelf-shock” occurred in all transitional economies immediately
after the fall of the Berlin wall.  A simple model framing this variety effect can contribute to
explaining several puzzles of transition.  It also has some relevant implications for the design of
policies accommodating economic transformation and for the EU enlargement process.
The bottoming-up of  transition recession has been in many countries associated to demand from
OECD countries of homogeneous goods produced in the East.   However, our model suggests that
durable growth can only come from the development of many specialised small units in the
manufacturing sector, that is, growth in the long-run can only come from an increase in enterprise
density.
Although entry is the driving force of long-term economic growth, in the short-run it diverts away
resources from production, thereby inducing output losses.  These initial losses are larger, the wider
the gap between the inherited enterprise density and that prevailing in the long-run.  The recovery
from the transitional recession is lower the higher the barriers to the entry of new firms.  Measures
reducing such barriers are likely to significantly speed-up the transition and reduce its costs in terms
of forgone output.
After the initial explosion of new business startups, the pace of creation of new firms is slowing
down considerably and these countries are still far from reaching enterprise densities comparable to
those of OECD countries.  Most of the development of a "new private sector" has occurred in “gap-
filling” service activities rather than in manufacturing.  The environment is still unfavourable to the
development of small firms in manufacturing: there are high real interest rates, lack of venture
capital, interlocking of banks and large corporations, and an absence of infrastructures for small
firms development.
                                                          
23 This data comprises all non agricultural enterprises.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
Trade liberalisation has been a major shocks for these countries, and one which has been associated
with dramatic output falls and a rise of non-employment. There are currently scholars arguing that
trade should have been liberalised only gradually.  Howewer, opening to trade has played a crucial
role in paving the way to the entry of new firms. Trade also promoted sub-contracting in some
sectors (e.g. machinery and apparel), which hopefully will  be followed by the transfer of know-
how and learning and the creation of  a critical mass of SMEs sufficiently dynamic and innovative.
But much remains to be done in order to reduce barriers to the entry and survival of new firms in
transitional economies.
The success of transition, notably of those countries that entering the European Union will likely
face increasing pressures for real wage convergence with the EU, will very much depend on how
fast is the reallocation of labour from homogenised to diversified good producers.
From an historical perspective, we have shown in this paper that high cost of entry had to be
accompanied with rather generous unemployment benefits in order to start the reallocation process
on a sufficiently large scale.  Non-employment benefits, however, ended-up increasing the social
security burden on the active population.  A better way to start the process would have been to
reduce the obstacles to the startup of new activities and, conditional on that, have lower non-
employment benefits in place.  Although it is easy to be wise after the events, some lessons are still
useful for the countries lagging behind the transition process.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
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Figure 4.  Enterprise density(1) and GDP per capita.
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Table 1.  Manufactured product specialisation in Eastern Europe, 1995.
SITC Comparative advantages RCAs
(1)
Export
share
 (in %)
SITC Comparative disadvantages RCAs
(1)
Import
share
 (in %)
CZECH REPUBLIC
67 Iron and steel 4.78 9.4 75 Office machines and automatic data proc. mach. -3.79 4.4
66 Non metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s. 3.88 5.7 76 Telecommunication and sound recording apparatus -2.70 3.0
69 Manufactures of metal, n.e.s. 2.96 6.0 74 Other industrial machinery and parts -2.59 6.5
65 Textile yarn and related products 2.77 4.8 77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances -2.32 6.0
78 Road vehicles 1.72 8.3 72 Specialised machinery -2.23 6.3
51 Organic chemicals 1.68 3.4 54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products -1.94 3.0
63 Cork and wood manufactures (exc. furniture) 1.14 1.6 87 Professional and scientific instruments -1.81 2.5
18.93 39.2 -17.38 31.7
HUNGARY
84 Articles of apparel & clothing accessories 5.61 8.04 65 Textile yarn and related products -3.47 5.73
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances 2.61 9.72 75 Office machines and automatic data proc. mach. -2.20 2.75
57 Plastics in primary forms 2.11 3.81 74 Other industrial machinery and parts -2.11 5.05
85 Footwear 1.11 2.10 64 Paper and paper manufactures -2.10 3.31
82 Furniture and parts thereof 0.81 1.77 79 Other transport equipment -1.25 1.45
63 Cork and wood manufactures (exc.furniture) 0.72 1.08 72 Specialised machinery -1.21 3.33
42 Fixed vegetable oils and fats, crude, ref.,
frac.
0.40 0.60 89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. -1.19 3.24
13.37 27.1 -13.53 25.0
POLAND
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 8.93 10.04 65 Textile yarn,fabrics,made-upart.,related products -5.18 7.45
82 Furniture and parts thereof 5.30 5.82 74 General industrial machinery & equip., and parts -4.02 6.06
68 Non-ferrous metals 4.71 5.98 75 Office machines & automatic data proc. equip. -2.77 2.91
79 Other transport equipment 4.42 4.66 72 Machinery specialized for particular industries -2.35 4.48
67 Iron and steel 2.44 5.60 54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products -2.18 3.16
69 Manufactures of metal,n.e.s. 2.24 4.95 76 Telecommunications & sound recording apparatus -1.79 2.53
63 Cork and wood manufactures (excl.furniture) 2.19 2.62 58 Artif.resins,plastic mat.,cellulose esters/ethers -1.56 1.82
30.23 39.7 -19.85 28.4
ROMANIA
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 17.6 19.3   65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up art., related products -7.1 9.2
67 Iron and steel 7.5 10.8   33 Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials -5.5 12.6
82 Furniture and parts thereof 5.5 6.0   34 Gas, natural and manufactured -5.4 5.4
85 Footwear 5.1 6.2   72 Machinery specialised for particular industries -4.7 6.1
56 Fertilizers, manufactured 4.3 4.4   74 General industrial machinery & equip. and parts -2.6 5.4
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 3.3 3.8   32 Coal, coke and briquettes -2.6 2.8
24 Cork and wood 2.6 2.7   77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances n.e.s. -2.3 4.5
45.9 53.2 -30.2 46.0William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
67 Iron and steel 12.5 17.2 75 Office machines & automatic data proc. equip. -3.2 3.4
66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures,n.e.s. 2.7 4.3 72 Machinery specialised for particular industries -2.9 4.8
62 Rubber manufactures,n.e.s. 2.5 3.1 74 General industrial machinery & equip.,and parts -1.9 4.9
65 Textile yarn,fabrics,made-upart, rel. prod. 2.0 4.3 54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products -1.3 3.1
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 2.0 3.0 77 Electrical machinery,apparatus & appliances n.e.s. -1.1 4.7
64 Paper,paperboard,artic.of paper,paper-pulp 1.7 3.9 76 Telecommunications & sound recording apparatus -1.1 2.0
82 Furniture and parts thereof 1.7 2.1 78 Road vehicles (incl. Air cushion vehicles -1.0 5.3
25.0 37.9 -12.5 28.3
SLOVENIA
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 5.16 7.92 93 Special transactions not classified accord.to kind -2.66 2.87
82 Furniture and parts thereof 4.26 5.41 75 Office machines, automatic data-processing equip. -2.21 2.36
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances 4.21 9.13 72 Machinery specialised for particular industries -2.08 3.99
64 Paper, paperboard, paper art.s, paper-pulp 2.59 4.72 57 Plastics in primary forms -1.46 2.32
63 Cork and wood manufactures,exc..furniture 2.44 3.20 78 Road vehicles incl. air cushion vehicles -1.13 12.58
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 2.09 3.83 51 Organic chemicals -0.87 2.25
62 Rubber manufactures n.e.s. 1.51 2.40 59 Chemical materials and products n.e.s. -0.87 1.35
22.26 36.6 -11.28 27.7
Notes: For all countries the sectors correspond to the ISIC rev 3, except Poland where ISIC rev 2 was used.
(1) The RCA indicator corresponds to (Xi/Σ Xk - Mi/Σ Mk).100, see text.
Source: OECD trade Statistics and national sources.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 301
Table 2. Simulation of the impact of liberalisation with different CPI measures
Variables
Pre-
-transition
After
liberalisation rate of change
Variety price p 1.00 1.50 50%
Homogeneous good price PH 1.00 1.00 0%
Aggregate elasticity of substitution σ 1.50 1.50 0%
Elasticity of  substitution between varieties σ x 10 10 0%
Number of varieties n 1 50 4900%
preference coefficient betwen H and D α 0.50 0.50 0%
Wage rate w 1.00 1.00 0%
Population L 1000.00 1000.00 0%
Price for the Composite good PD 1.00 0.97 -3%
CPI as weighted average of H and p (1) CPI $ 1.00 1.25 25%
CPI incorporating the variety effect (1) CPI 1.00 0.99 -1%
real GDP using CPI $  (2) GDP $ 1000.00 800.00 -20%
real GDP  using CPI (2) GDP 1000.00 1014.76 1%
(1) See text.
(2) Computed as  w.L / CPI
Table 3. Comparison of Enterprise Density (number of enterprises per 1,000)
EU Central and Eastern Europe
1
Inhabitants 43 31
Active population 95 64
Non farming population 113 83
 (1) Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
      Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Source: EuroStat (1996b).